Global Cyber Intermediary Liability: A Legal & Cultural Strategy by Peterson, Jason H. et al.
Pace Law Review 
Volume 34 
Issue 2 Spring 2014 Article 3 
April 2014 
Global Cyber Intermediary Liability: A Legal & Cultural Strategy 
Jason H. Peterson 
Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University 
Lydia Segal 
Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University 
Anthony Eonas 
Sawyer Business School, Suffolk University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Computer Law Commons, Criminal Law 
Commons, International Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the National Security Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jason H. Peterson, Lydia Segal, and Anthony Eonas, Global Cyber Intermediary Liability: A Legal 
& Cultural Strategy, 34 Pace L. Rev. 586 (2014) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
  
 
586 
 
Global Cyber Intermediary 
Liability: A Legal & Cultural 
Strategy 
 
Jason H. Peterson,* Lydia Segal,**  
and Anthony Eonas*** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Cybercrime is one of the most serious problems facing 
modern economies around the world.1 In the United States 
alone cybercrime cost an estimated $9 billion in 2011.2 In 
Germany, it cost about $6 billion that year.3 
Reformers have poured a great deal of effort into trying to 
figure out what to do about the problem.4 Scholars have written 
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Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
** Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Sawyer Business School, 
Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
*** Associate Professor of Business Law & Ethics, Sawyer Business School, 
Suffolk University, Boston, MA. 
1. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2012 COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: UNITED 
STATES 1-2 (2012), http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/2012_US_Cost_of 
_Cyber_Crime_Study_FINAL6%20.pdf; see also Charlotte Decker, Cybercrime 
2.0: An Argument to Update the United States Criminal Code to Reflect the 
Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (2008). 
2. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2; see also Sara Yin, Cyber 
Crime Costs Jump 56 Percent, PC MAG. (Aug. 3, 2011, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2390371,00.asp. 
3. PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2. 
4. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Distributed Security: 
Preventing Cybercrime, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 659 (2005); 
Decker, supra note 1, at 963; Salil K. Mehra, Law and Cybercrime in the 
United States Today, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 659 (2010); Michael Edmund O'Neill, 
Old Crimes in New Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
237 (2000); Meiring de Villiers, Enabling Technologies of Cyber Crime: Why 
Lawyers Need to Understand It, 11 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 4 (2011); 
Jonathan B. Wolf, War Games Meets the Internet: Chasing 21st Century 
Cybercriminals with Old Laws and Little Money, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95 (2000). 
1
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about it extensively and put forth multiple proposals for 
change.5 So far, however, little seems to be making a dent.6 In 
fact, cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, more vicious, 
and more expensive every year.7 
One reason for the lack of an effective solution may be that 
scholars and experts are focused almost entirely on 
cybercriminals and the countries that support their crimes.8 
They seem to be largely ignoring the critical role played by 
intermediaries, which include both Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) and hosts, in facilitating cybercrime.9 ISPs provide the 
actual gateway for users to the Internet, while hosts provide 
server space to users.10 Some intermediaries provide both 
functions.11 A search of law reviews reveals no recent articles 
considering policy changes geared towards ISP liability as 
means to combat cybercrime and a complete disregard for the 
role of hosts. 
On the one hand, this lack of attention to ISPs and failure 
to spotlight their strategic relationships to hosts are 
astonishing because hosts and ISPs provide the means and 
venue for cybercriminals to operate. On the other hand, the 
lack of attention is understandable because hosts and ISPs 
operate in a virtual no-man’s land in terms of laws, legislation, 
and even national jurisdiction.12 This is in spite of the 
 
5. See sources cited supra note 4. 
6. See Decker, supra note 1, at 961-62. 
7. See PONEMON INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 2; see also Yin, supra note 2 
(discussing the challenge of determining the cost of cybercrime). The median 
annual cost of cybercrime for organizations in 2011 was $5.9 million, which 
represented a 56 percent annual increase. Yin, supra note 2. The components 
of loss include: (1) intellectual property; (2) direct financial; (3) sensitive 
information; (4) opportunity costs; (5) recovery costs; and (6) reputation. Id.; 
see also Decker, supra note 1, at 963 (noting cybercrime results in billions of 
annual losses). 
8. See sources cited supra note 4. 
9. See id. 
10. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 256 (2005); see also Ctr. 
for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613-15 (E.D. Pa. 
2004). 
11. See Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 613-15; Mann & Belzley, supra note 
10, at 256. 
12. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 10, at 244. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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important regulatory function ISPs play online.13 
This Article fills the gap in the debate on fighting 
cybercrime. It considers the role of intermediaries and the legal 
and cultural strategies that countries may adopt. Part II.A of 
this Article examines the critical role of intermediaries in 
cybercrime. It shows that the intermediaries’ active 
participation by facilitating the transmission of cybercrime 
traffic removes a significant barrier for individual perpetrators. 
Part II.B offers a brief overview of legal efforts to combat 
cybercrime, and examines the legal liability of intermediaries 
in both the civil and criminal context and in varying legal 
regimes with an emphasis on ISPs. Aside from some level of 
injunctive relief, intermediaries operate in a largely 
unregulated environment. Part III looks at what we can learn 
from other countries. The cleanest intermediary country, 
Finland, and the worst country, Lithuania, were selected in 
order to explore the causes for the differences between country 
performances. The section examines the remarkable 
distinctions between national cultures to explain differences in 
national cybercrime rates. 
Part III.A of this Article argues that the criminal code laws 
do not account for the difference in host and ISP performances 
between Finland and Lithuania. There are few differences in 
the codified laws pertaining to cybercrime between these 
countries. Instead, it is Finland’s cultural and business 
environments that appear to drive its cybercrime ranking. Part 
IV suggests reforms to shift a country’s culture to make it less 
prone to corruption. However, changing a culture takes time so 
Part IV also proposes a private law scheme in which 
intermediaries are unable to wave the “flag of immunity,” as 
they do now. The guiding philosophy for this proposal is that 
harmed parties should be permitted to recover damages 
directly from “bad” intermediaries. 
 
 
 
 
13. See Sandra Braman & Stephanie Lynch, Advantage ISP: Terms of 
Service as Media Law, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS 249, 250-51 
(Lorrie Faith Cranor & Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003). 
3
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II. Intermediaries 
 
A. Intermediaries and Cybercriminals 
 
Cybercriminals do not operate within a vacuum.14 The 
Internet’s framework consists of a handful of intermediaries, 
each with its own relationship with the cybercriminal.15 For 
example, an individual who creates and releases a Trojan in 
Lithuania relies upon a handful of participants.16 Figure 1 
provides a simplified view of the relationships of several 
intermediaries, including registration companies, hosting 
companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Registration 
companies provide website domain names to Internet users.17 
Hosting firms sell server space and provide IP addresses to 
those who wish to access the Internet.18 ISPs provide the actual 
gateway to the Internet for the Lithuanian perpetrator.19 
 
14. See de Villiers, supra note 4, at 16-17. 
15. Id. at 16. 
16. A Trojan is a form of malware that discretely convinces users that it 
is a harmless computer program. See Jon Brodkin, Viruses, Trojans, and 
Worms, Oh My: The Basics on Malware, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 1, 2013, 9:00 
AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/02/viruses-trojans-and-worms-oh-
my-the-basics-on-malware. The results range from harmless pop-up windows 
to extensive damage to the operator’s computer often providing a gateway to 
infiltrate the user’s computer or network. Id. Today, hackers are more likely 
to be large-scale corporate entities than single perpetrators thereby providing 
substantial leverage in the online market. See John Loveland et al., Be 
Afraid, Be Very Afraid: The Rise of Organized Cyber Crime, CORP. 
COMPLIANCE & ETHICS INST. (2010), available at 
http://discover.pli.edu/Details/Details?start=0&rows=50&sort=s_title%20asc
&fq=~2B~title_id~3A282B22~23683~2229202B~id~3A282B22~23683-
CH44~2229~&facet=true&qt=legal_boolean. 
17. See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613-
15 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
18. See INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS 
(ICANN), http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars (last visited Oct. 25, 
2013). 
19. See generally Braman & Lynch, supra note 13, at 249. The ISP 
industry has seen tremendous growth through the 2000s. Id. at 252. This is 
largely due to diminishing startup costs and the explosive growth of the 
Internet. Id. There are means by which ISPs may be distinguished from one 
another including geographic region, the services offered, and its fit within 
the architecture of the Internet including whether it is downstream or 
upstream, the types of content it packs and whether its services include web 
hosting. Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  The Connection between Malware and Intermediaries 
 
Malware is the most common form of cybercrime and 
therefore represents the most prevalent means in which 
cybercriminals interact with intermediaries.20 Malware has 
three primary forms.21 First, a virus reproduces as it spreads 
across computers deleting and stealing data as it travels.22 
Executable files deliver the virus, which remains dormant until 
the end user opens the file and triggers the virus.23 Second, 
 
20. Cybercrime According to the Experts, 19 NEXT WAVE 60, 60 (2012), 
http://www.nsa.gov/research/tnw/tnw192/articles/pdfs/TNW192_article10.pdf. 
21. See Brodkin, supra note 16. 
22. See id. But see Mann & Belzley, supra note 10, at 241 (noting less of 
a need to hold intermediaries responsible in the area of viruses, spam, 
phishing, and hacking because of the perceived inability to control the 
content and because of the market incentive of ISPs to provide a clean 
network). 
23. See Brodkin, supra note 16. File sharing and email attachments 
The Internet 
Registration 
Companies 
Perpetrators 
Internet 
Service 
Providers 
Hosting Firms 
5
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worms are similar except that they do not rely upon other files, 
thus, they are often able to spread across vast computer 
networks.24 Finally, trojans convince users that they are 
harmless computer programs.25 The results range from 
harmless pop-up windows to extensive damage to the 
operator’s computer.26 Trojans often provide a means for users 
to infiltrate the host’s computer or network.27 
Not only does malware attack computers but it also creates 
“botnets.” These are large networks of “zombie” computers that 
may be harmless to the computer operator but may respond to 
commands at the cybercriminal’s discretion from a controlling 
server.28 Criminals who establish botnets frequently rent 
access to the infected network to other criminals who 
“monetize” the access.29 The Russian Business Network (RBN) 
provides an apt example of a host and the release of a botnet.30 
RBN provides the portal for numerous activities and collects 
“infrastructure fees” that result from the fraud.31 In 2007, RBN 
was responsible for releasing the BOTnet “storm” that 
controlled between 1 million and 50 million computers.32 
Clients would then pay RBN for unfettered access to a portion 
of the computers.33 
 
 
 
 
often spread the virus. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. Remote Access Trojans are “beefed up” backdoors that 
contain a user interface permitting the attacker to issue destructive 
commands. See id. Commentators occasionally refer to malware as a 
“backdoor” as it bypasses firewalls and executes an object connecting users to 
the perpetrator’s workstation and corresponding network files. See id. 
“Information stealers” often misappropriate information through the use of 
keystroke recording devices known as “key loggers.” See id. “Ransomware” on 
the other hand holds a user hostage until the user compensates the 
perpetrator to restore the computer. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. See Loveland et al., supra note 16. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. 
33. See id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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2.  The Regulatory Landscape of the Internet 
 
One symptom of the fact that no one is focusing on the role 
of intermediaries in cybercrime is that these entities operate in 
a virtual regulatory no-man’s land. The Internet itself is highly 
decentralized.34 Its open, virtually lawless architecture was 
originally designed in a small community that had a high 
degree of trust.35 The point was to keep the Internet as free 
from regulation as possible in order to foster an unfettered 
exchange of information. At the time, cybercrime was unlikely 
to be considered a major problem. To the extent that 
cybercrime was considered a major problem, the assumption 
was that the marketplace would clear it up through self-
regulation.36 
Although the self-regulatory model above is probably the 
most closely accurate description of how the Internet actually 
functions today, three other models suggest that there may be 
alternative, informal or unofficial, ways to regulate the 
Internet. These models are: (1) neo-mercantilist; (2) culturalist; 
and (3) globalism.37 The neo-mercantilist model suggests that 
the government intervenes occasionally to police cybercrime to 
ensure the free flow of commerce within the channels of the 
Internet.38 This policing mostly concerns cybercriminals, not 
intermediaries. 
The culturalist model emphasizes the protection offered by 
the local culture within its regulatory structure.39 For example, 
in the United States, although there are no laws specifically 
designed to hold intermediaries liable for the crimes they 
 
34. See CircleID Reporter, Who Runs the Internet? ICANN Attempts to 
Clarify the Answer with This Map, CIRCLEID (Mar. 6, 2013, 9:46 AM), 
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130306_who_runs_the_internet_icann_attem
pts_to_clarify_answer_with_map/. The multiple stakeholders include society, 
the private sector, governments, research groups, and NGOs. See id. 
35. See Roderic Broadhurst, Developments in the Global Law 
Enforcement of Cyber-Crime, 29 INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 408, 
409, 412 (2006). 
36. See Kevin A. Meehan, The Continuing Conundrum of International 
Internet Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 353 (2008). 
37. Id. 
38. See id. at 354. 
39. See id. 
7
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facilitate, there is a culture wherein prosecutors sometimes 
make use of a handful of other laws to combat cybercrime. 
These laws include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act40, the 
CAN-SPAM Act41, the Electronic Communications, the Privacy 
Act42, the Lanham Act43, and the Racketeer Influence and 
Corrupt Organizations Act.44 The necessity of proving mens 
rea, however, renders these laws largely ineffective as applied 
to intermediaries.45 
Finally, the globalism model suggests that there is some 
incipient Internet regulation in the form of international 
cooperation and agreements such as the Convention on 
Cybercrime (the Convention).46 Hardly any of these 
international agreements discuss host and ISP liability. The 
Convention merely defines a service provider as “any public or 
private entity that provides a service via the computer or any 
entity that stores data for such an online service.”47 The 
Convention says nothing about imposing liability.48 
While the neo-mercantilist, culturalist, and globalism 
models each describe a small part of existing Internet 
regulation, there is very little regulation as a whole. To the 
extent that the Internet is regulated at all, its governance is in 
the hands of a grab-bag of organizations representing divergent 
stakeholder perspectives.49 Because many of these stakeholders 
have different interests, it is questionable whether this multi-
stakeholder approach can operate efficiently.50 Developing 
countries, for example, argue that they are underrepresented 
in Internet governance and that an international organization, 
 
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 7704 (2012). 
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2701. 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). 
45. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10 (discussing mens rea). 
46. See Meehan, supra note 36, at 355; see also Nancy E. Marion, The 
Council of Europe’s Cyber Crime Treaty: An Exercise in Symbolic Legislation, 
4 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701 (2010). 
47. Marion, supra note 46, at 705. 
48. See id. at 705-06. 
49. See Bevil Wooding, The Brewing Internet Governance Storm, 
CIRCLEID (Aug. 30, 2012, 4:28 PM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20120830_ 
the_brewing_internet_governance_storm/. 
50. See id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
should expand its regulatory oversight.51 Most observers would 
probably agree that the large number of regulatory bodies and 
lack of any single one with overriding authority has in large 
part failed to keep the Internet safe. That is why there may be 
a shift to increasing the international agreements described in 
the globalism model, as evidenced by the Convention.52 
Perhaps the most impressive global initiative to regulate 
the Internet came in 1997, when the forty-seven nations that 
comprise the Council of Europe commissioned the formation of 
a comprehensive set of laws to combat cybercrime.53 The 
Convention became effective in July 2004 after Lithuania 
ratified it in March of that year.54 Twenty-three countries have 
 
51. See id. Telecommunications companies are largely dissatisfied with 
current Internet governance. They feel that they invested in the 
infrastructure of the Internet and now, compared to the fortunes realized by 
Google, Skype and Facebook, are being left behind. See id. 
52. See infra notes 53-68 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Convention). However, this decentralized system enhances governance 
flexibility and has led to the amazing growth of the Internet. See Wooding, 
supra note 49. One centralized entity that governs the Internet is the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which is a 
private organization that manages IP addresses and domain names. See 
BRIGID GRAUMAN, CYBER-SECURITY: THE VEXED QUESTION OF GLOBAL RULES, 
AN INDEPENDENT REPORT ON CYBER-PREPAREDNESS AROUND THE WORLD 29 
(2012), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-sda-cyber-security.pdf. 
The legislative and executive branches of the United States government have 
cautioned against too much control within a multi-stakeholder Internet 
governance model. See Rebecca MacKinnon, The United Nations and the 
Internet: It’s Complicated, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 8, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/08/the_united_nations_and_the
_internet_it_s_complicated. However, because cybercrime crosses national 
boundaries, multilateral efforts are a critical deterrent. John Sinden, Jr., 
Cybersecurity at the International Level, EASTWEST INST. (April 30, 2012), 
www.ewi.info/cybersecutiry-international-level. The organizations devoted to 
fighting cybercrime include the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), and the Computer Emergency 
Response Pre-configuration Team (CERT-EU). See id. 
53. See Marion, supra note 46, at 701. 
54. See LORENZO VALERI ET AL., HANDBOOK OF LEGAL PROCEDURES OF 
COMPUTER AND NETWORK MISUSE IN EU COUNTRIES 18 n.2 (2006). While the 
Convention provides a comprehensive framework, its value is largely 
symbolic and may not be effective otherwise. See Marion, supra note 46, at 
701. One criticism is that even as more countries ratify the Convention, some 
countries will provide a safe haven for cyber criminals. See id. Symbolic 
legislation does perform the function of “moral educative function” by 
9
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since ratified the Convention; the United States Senate did so 
in 2006.55 The Convention provided the framework under 
which signatory countries developed their respective laws to 
combat cybercrime.56 The Convention provides three primary 
offenses: (1) Article 2 governs the illegal accessing of 
information; (2) Article 5 governs system interference; and (3) 
Article 4 governs data interference.57 Intermediary liability, 
however, is unlikely because of the Convention’s demand that 
all criminal offenses be committed intentionally—and 
intermediaries naturally assert that they are unaware of the 
criminal activity on their networks.58 
The laws of each ratifying country had to meet the 
Convention’s minimum threshold. For example, under Article 2 
of the Convention, 
 
[e]ach Party shall adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to establish 
as criminal offences under its domestic law, 
when committed intentionally, the access to the 
whole or any part of a computer system without 
right. A Party may require that the offence be 
committed by infringing security measures, with 
the intent of obtaining computer data or other 
dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer 
system that is connected to another computer 
system.59 
 
Country specific laws must satisfy this provision although 
 
educating people of what is right and wrong behavior. See id. at 706. It 
further provides guidance to those countries considering a regulatory 
framework. See id. 
55. See Marion, supra note 46, at 702. 
56. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 40916. 
57. Id. at 4-5; see also VALERI ET AL., supra note 54, at 18. This is just a 
minimum threshold as countries are free to codify more stringent 
requirements. See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 56, at 4-5. 
58. Cedric J. Magnin, The 2001 Council of Europe Convention on Cyber-
Crime: An Efficient Tool to Fight Crime in Cyber-Space? 55 (June 2001) 
(unpublished L.L.M. dissertation, Santa Clara University) (on file with 
author). 
59. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 56, at 4. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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some countries have “opted out” of Convention provisions.60 
The Convention largely mirrors corresponding provisions 
in the European Council Framework Decision on Attacks 
against Information Systems (Framework Decision).61 The 
Framework Decision provides the baseline for furthering 
awareness of Cybercrime through the application of 
meaningful assistance through the cooperation of the judicial 
system and other domestic authorities.62 Both the Convention 
and the Framework Decision share provisions, including those 
that pertain to aiding and abetting and the liability of legal 
persons.63 
At least one commentator has incorrectly asserted that the 
Convention does not exempt ISPs from criminal liability for the 
content of third parties based upon the aiding and abetting 
provision.64 That suggestion is unfounded, as the Convention is 
clear that it does not require ISPs to monitor content.65 
Liability would only attach under Article 11 for aiding and 
abetting if the ISP shared the mental state with the 
perpetrator.66 The standard for aiding and abetting “requires 
the defendant to have (1) substantially assisted another who 
committed a violation of international law and (2) known that 
his actions would assist in the illegal or wrongful activity at the 
time he provided the assistance.”67 Further, Article 12, 
governing corporate liability, only attaches if an individual 
with a high degree of authority violates Article 2, 4, or 5 or if a 
lack of supervision results in an individual perpetrating a 
crime to benefit the corporation.68 
 
60. See, e.g., Treaty Office, List of Declarations Made with Respect to 
Treaty No. 185, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ 
ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last updated 
Mar. 17, 2014). 
61. See VALERI ET AL., supra note 54, at 18. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 23. Both the Convention and the Framework Decision 
require that criminal offences be “punishable by effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions, which include deprivation of liberty.” Id. 
64. See Magnin, supra note 58, at 63. 
65. See id. at 64. 
66. See id. 
67. Anne Cheung & Rolf H. Weber, Internet Governance and the 
Responsibility of Internet Service Providers, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 403, 470 (2008). 
68. See Magnin, supra note 58, at 65. 
11
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B. Intermediary Liability 
 
Intermediaries face few repercussions for the activity on 
their servers and networks, and therefore have little incentive 
to monitor criminal traffic.69 The burning question, therefore, is 
whether regulatory policies should impose indirect liability on 
intermediaries for activities in which knowledge is difficult to 
prove.70 To date, intermediaries such as ISPs have avoided 
liability despite the fact that they are in a favorable position to 
monitor and control cybercrime.71 
In fact, ISPs wield an almost regulatory function online 
and thereby operate in an environment of control without 
liability.72 This regulatory function is bolstered by the 
 
69. See NOAH SHACHTMAN, BROOKINGS INST., PIRATES OF THE ISPS: 
TACTICS FOR TURNING ONLINE CROOKS INTO INTERNATIONAL PARIAHS 3 (2011). 
70. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers 
Accountable 8 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 217, 2004) (noting indirect liability arises in those instances in 
which a party is held liable for the wrongs of another). 
71. See id. at 4. 
72. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 3. Ten out of 5,000 ISPs account 
for around thirty percent of spam worldwide. See id. But see BRUCE A. 
LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 116 (1995) (“[I]t is . . . virtually impossible 
for operators of large systems to contemporaneously review every message 
transmitted or file uploaded.”). ISPs, however, wield power in the amount of 
information they control and retain. See Cheung & Weber, supra note 67, at 
403-04 (comparing ISPs to “secret police” and “surveillance centers”). In the 
context of offensive speech, authorities often seek to hold intermediaries such 
as ISPs liable even absent any knowledge of the content of the speech. See id. 
at 408-09. Therefore, the government has enlisted the services of these 
intermediaries to monitor the content of the speech even if the intermediary 
is from a country with different norms concerning protected speech. See id. at 
409. The result has been an over filtering of legitimate speech in order to 
capture the intended speech as mandated by the government. See id. at 409-
10. Not only are ISPs encouraged to censor speech, but they are also policing 
the Internet by informing governments of suspected content violations. See 
id. at 412. Critics have noted that ISPs perform a regulatory function even 
though they do not satisfy the “regulatory criterion of being all-
encompassing.” Braman & Lynch, supra note 13, at 253. Further, they do not 
answer to constituents in a democratic society. See id. at 267. For example, 
ISPs have claimed that they are merely information distributors and not 
content providers while they have claimed control over the intellectual 
property they transmit. See id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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cooperation between the government and ISPs.73 For example, 
the provisions of the Convention mandated communication 
between ISPs and law enforcement.74 Further, both Canada 
and China have relied upon ISPs as informers as well.75 In the 
United States, the Court in American Council on Education v. 
FCC held that the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law 
Enforcement could require ISPs to provide better and more 
reliable infrastructure to conduct surveillance on behalf of law 
enforcement.76 Despite this leverage and power, ISPs rarely 
self-regulate criminal activity on their networks.77 
Asserting indirect liability over ISPs is appropriate both 
because of the better position of ISPs as detectors of nefarious 
activities and because ISPs are better able to internalize 
negative externalities.78 Indirect liability also becomes more 
attractive when the liable party has an increased ability to 
influence or prevent “bad” behavior.79 The vast regulatory 
control of ISPs illustrates this point.80 Simple distinctions 
between ISPs and individual perpetrators further suggest their 
better position to absorb liability.81 For example, ISPs tend to 
maintain a static location and have “deeper pockets” compared 
to individual perpetrators.82 In the context of cybercrime, the 
perpetrators are largely outside the reach of the law.83 This is 
true for two reasons. First, the nature of cybercrime conceals 
the perpetrator and permits the perpetrator to time the attack 
in order to hide his identity and location.84 Second, the 
perpetrators often lack the financial resources to compensate 
 
73. See Cheung & Weber, supra note 67, at 404. 
74. See Marion, supra note 46, at 704-05. 
75. See Cheung & Weber, supra note 67, at 412-16. 
76. Am. Council on Educ. V. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
77. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 18. For example, the ISP for the 
notoriously bad host Mc-Colo did not remove Mc-Colo from its network until 
journalists gathered and presented substantial evidence of its behavior. See 
id. 
78. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 22-23. 
79. See id. at 18. 
80. See id. at 18-20. 
81. See id. at 15-16. 
82. See id. at 15. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
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the injured parties.85 Harmed parties may be too far removed 
from judgment-proof perpetrators.86 
Not surprisingly, there are several market-based 
challenges for ISPs to monitor their networks. ISP profit 
margins may suffer if they get overly aggressive monitoring 
online activity.87 Further, victims may be on a network far 
removed from the ISP such that the ISP may lack the incentive 
to police content.88 Finally, ISPs may only voluntarily absorb 
the costs of maintaining a clean network when the cost of non-
responsiveness is high. For example, a Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS) attack—which results in an expansive overload 
of traffic on the network—may prompt a swift reaction by 
ISPs.89 
One noted problem with instituting a penalty on ISPs for 
criminal activity on their networks is that a fine or other 
penalty may discourage ISPs from actively investigating 
suspicious activity, such as turning a blind eye to the content 
makes it easier to assert a lack of knowledge.90 Indirect liability 
imposed on ISPs may also discourage users from engaging in 
“self-help” through virus software updates and the 
maintenance of firewalls.91 Moreover, further active 
development of virus software and prophylactic technology 
 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 15-16, 22-23. 
87. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 20. There are also economic 
concerns related to the online marketplace. See Lichtman & Posner, supra 
note 70, at 23. Indirect liability will raise the prices to service accounts 
because of the increased legal liability. See id. As a result, select customers 
may not be able to participate in the market. See id. This concern increases 
when participants within the market prefer the inclusion of customers in the 
online marketplace. See id. The effect of this externality might be limited 
because the subscriber can often internalize the effect by offering the 
customer product discounts, and other incentives. See id. Cybercriminals, 
who stand to make significant income from crime are likely to make 
extensive use of their hosts/ISPs, thus constituting a significant portion of 
those the ISP’s/host’s traffic and profits. See Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo & 
Russell G. Smith, Criminal Exploitation of Online Systems by Organised 
Crime Groups, 3 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 37, 37 (2008). 
88. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 20. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. Alternatively, several have proposed a cleanup fund 
subsidized by the government and software companies. See id. 
91. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 26-27. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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might also be reduced.92 
There is a well-developed body of case and statutory law in 
the United States that shields ISPs from civil liability. 
Traditionally, those ISPs who facilitate the distribution of 
communication which could lead to a common law wrong (e.g. 
defamation) would have been immune from liability, so long as 
they had no knowledge of the act itself. For example, early on, 
courts did not hold ISPs liable for the communication of 
defamatory statements through its equipment if they were a 
passive distributor compared to a publisher.93 However, 
subsequent decisions classified ISPs as publishers whenever 
they actively manipulated editorial content.94 This resulted in a 
reluctance to filter content under the guise that the court 
would be less likely to view it as a publisher.95 Subsequently, in 
Zeran v. American Online, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) 
equally immunized both publishers and distributors.96 Section 
230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content 
provider.”97 This provision has uniformly shielded ISPs from 
liability. 
Another example of a United States court declining to hold 
an ISP liable for third party content arose in Doe v. GTE 
 
92. See id. 
93. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
94. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, 
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
95. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 34. 
96. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 1997). 
Some have argued that the language of Section 230 was interpreted contrary 
to its plain language. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 36. But see 
Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Ex-Bengals Cheerleader Scores Win in Internet 
Defamation Suit, LAW360 (July 11, 2013, 7:06 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/456738/ex-bengals-cheerleader-scores-win-in-
internet-defamation-suit (reporting recent jury decision attaching liability to 
the website TheDirty.com for the untrue statements concerning the sex life a 
Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader in the National Football League). The judge 
denied protection under the CDA because the website “encouraged 
development of what is offensive about the content of TheDirty.com website.” 
Rodriquez, supra note 96 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
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Corp.98 In Doe, college athletes sued GTE Corporation and 
Genuity Corporation after the two companies used their web 
hosting services on behalf of several production companies for 
the sale of the videos of the unclothed athletes in locker 
rooms.99 The athletes claimed that the defendants had aided 
and abetted the production companies in providing web hosting 
services for activity that violated the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.100 The court declined to 
extend the application of the Act beyond the perpetrators 
noting that federal courts rarely find secondary liability absent 
a clear articulation of liability.101 Further, the court found that 
defendants were indifferent to the content they hosted and did 
not intend to promote the wrongdoing of the production 
companies.102 
Doe and Zeran addressed defamation and privacy 
concerns, but there was little change in the court’s analysis 
when the court considered ISP liability in the context of 
malware. An unanswered question after Zeran was whether 
malicious code disseminated by ISPs amounted to information 
under the CDA. In Green v. America Online, Green sued 
America Online (“AOL”) because a hacker sent a program over 
the AOL network that disrupted Green’s computer.103 The court 
held that AOL was immune because attaching liability would 
amount to treating AOL as the publisher of the program.104 
Interestingly, the court disagreed with the plaintiff that the 
 
98. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
99. Id. at 656. 
100. Id. at 658. The district court’s motion to dismiss relied partly on the 
CDA, which preempts state or local law but not the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act. See id. The Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act provides that 
any person who—(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or 
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication; (b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or 
procures any other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication . . . [may 
face civil liability]. 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
101. Doe, 347 F.3d at 658. 
102. Id. at 659. 
103. Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 469 (3d Cir. 2002). 
104. Id. at 470-71. 
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harmful computer program was not “information” under the 
CDA thereby leaving the liability question perhaps 
unresolved.105 
In the United States, the law could treat ISPs as carriers, 
publishers, or distributors with each classification influencing 
different levels of potential liability.106 The carrier classification 
attaches little liability, as once again, the mens rea element is 
critical.107 For example, the federal child pornography act has 
included “knowingly” as the mens rea term for each of the 
offenses pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252.108 The carrier 
interpretation is consistent with the laws of both the United 
Kingdom and Germany.109 While not entirely clear, Finland, 
Japan, and Latvia, likely interpret the mens rea element in the 
same manner.110 
A publisher classification, on the other hand, would attach 
a high degree of culpability.111 For example, Sweden appears to 
apply a strict liability standard on publishers in radio and 
television for offences related to public order, child 
pornography, and unauthorized depictions of violence.112 
Finally, a distributor is less likely to face liability compared to 
a publisher even though the two are difficult to distinguish.113 
Control, is often the cited factor in making the determination, 
the greater the control of the content the more likely the law is 
to consider the ISP a publisher. 
One apparent shortcoming in the penalty structure applied 
 
105. Id. at 471. 
106. See Mark Tantum, Internet Crimes: Legal Responsibility of Internet 
Service Providers, in 14 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 383, 383-86 (1998). Privacy 
concerns in the postal and telecommunications context limit the analogy 
because “legislatures have generally adopted the view that postal and 
communications carriers should only be prosecuted for the carriage of illegal 
information if they know the nature of the information that they are 
carrying.” Id. at 384. ISPs operate in a liability regime that consists of 
negligence, strict liability, or immunity. See Braman & Lynch, supra note 13, 
at 254. 
107. See Tantum, supra note 106, at 384. 
108. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012). 
109. See Tantum, supra note 106, at 384. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. at 385. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
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to intermediaries under United States law is that the remedy is 
often equitable, thereby providing little disincentive. For 
example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may seek to 
shut down “bad” ISPs.114 The FTC has authority under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act to prevent unfair and deceptive 
acts or practices and may seek either injunctive or equitable 
relief.115 In 2009, for instance, the FTC shut down Pricewert, 
an ISP incorporated in Oregon with corporate officials outside 
of the United States.116 The FTC argued that “Pricewert 
[r]ecruits and [w]illingly [d]istributes [i]llegal, [m]alicious and 
[h]armful [c]ontent” and that it was “fully aware” that it was 
hosting the content.117 The FTC further contended that 
Pricewert was “collud[ing] with its criminal clientele in several 
areas, including the maintenance and deployment of 
botnets.”118 Despite these allegations, the FTC merely shut 
down the ISP. Those damaged by the harmful content never 
recovered. 
More recently, in 2012, Microsoft sued the perpetrators of 
the Zeus botnets.119 In connection with the lawsuit, legal 
officials raided several hosts that were associated the 
defendants after Microsoft had conducted an extensive 
investigation.120 The remedy sought was merely an injunction 
ordering the isolation of the content and material associated 
with the botnet.121 Once again, there was no recovery on behalf 
of the harmed parties.122 
Aside from the United States, a handful of countries have 
 
114. See Complaint at 1, FTC v. Pricewert LLC, 2009 WL 2749865 (N.D. 
Cal. June 1, 2009) (No. 509-CV-02407). 
115. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 45(a), 53(b) (2012). 
116. See FTC v. Pricewert LLC, No. C-09-2407, 2009 WL 1689598, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. June 15, 2009). 
117. Complaint at 3, FTC v. Pricewert LLC, 2009 WL 2749865. 
118. Id. at 4. 
119. See Motion for Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, 
Microsoft Corp. v. Does, No. 12-CV-1335, (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012). 
120. See Jim Finkle, Microsoft Seizes Servers in Zeus Cyberfraud, 
REUTERS (March 26, 2012, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/net-us-cyberfraud-
idUSBRE82P0ZD20120326.. 
121. See Motion for Default Judgment and Permanent Injunciton, supra, 
note 119. 
122. Id.. 
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considered the emerging problem of regulating intermediaries, 
but little reform has resulted. For example, Nigeria, a country 
rife with cybercrime, has considered extending regulatory 
oversight over intermediaries including ISPs.123 One study in 
Nigeria found that “[t]here is [a] significant relationship 
between the awareness of [I]nternet intermediary liabilities 
and level of misconducts over the Internet in Nigeria.”124 The 
study further found that ISPs in Nigeria provide little security 
against cybercrime.125 Despite these findings, little has 
changed in Nigeria.126 
A form of self-regulation, however, appears to have had 
some effect in Australia. There, the Internet Industry 
Association developed a voluntary code (icode) in which ISPs 
identify and inform customers of attacks.127 More than ninety 
percent of Australian ISPs have committed to icode.128 Under 
icode, if the ISP shows that malware has infected the user’s 
computer, the user is redirected to the icode homepage where 
self-help tools are available to clean the computer.129 It is a 
relatively new program and its effectiveness has yet to bear 
out. 
III. What Can We Learn from Other Countries?  
Finland v. Lithuania 
 
To explore what can be learned from other countries, the 
worst-performing country (in terms of “bad” intermediaries), 
Lithuania, and the best-performing country (in terms of “good” 
intermediaries), Finland, were selected.130 The report classifies 
 
123. See O.B. Longe et al., Internet Service Providers and Cybercrime in 
Nigeria–Balancing Services and ICT Development, INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
FORUM SECRETARIAT (2008), http://lawlibraryarchive.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ 
ref/collection/p15430coll3/id/146. 
124. Id. at 9. 
125. See id. at 9-10. 
126. See id. 
127. ICODE, http://icode.net.au/home-why.php / (last visited Oct. 16, 
2013). 
128. See Hamish Barwick, IIA Seeks Input into iCode Review from ISPs, 
Security Vendors, COMPUTERWORLD (April 3, 2012, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/420418/iia_seeks_input_into_icode_
review_from_isps_security_vendors. 
129. See id. 
130. See GLOBAL SECURITY REPORT, HOSTEXPLOIT’S WORLDWIDE 
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hosts, registrars, and ISPs as intermediaries and ranks the 
corresponding “malicious activity” by country.131 Lithuania is 
ranked number one with the highest level of malicious activity 
of all reported countries, while Finland is ranked number 219 
with the lowest level.132 The United States is ranked number 
11.133 
The gap between high performing Finland and poor 
performing Lithuania presents an opportunity to examine what 
factors contribute to the difference.. Do the public laws of 
Finland or Lithuania account for the difference in country 
performance? Do cultural factors? What can countries do to 
become more like Finland and less like Lithuania in terms of 
intermediary cybercrime? 
 
A. Legal Environment 
 
In Lithuania and Finland, law enforcement applies the 
terms of the Convention as adopted in both countries.134 In 
Lithuania, the Ministry of the Interior controls the Police 
Department.135 On October 1, 2001, the Lithuanian Criminal 
Police Bureau established a special Cybercrime Unit that 
monitors, detects, and prevents violations of the Convention.136 
Similarly, in Finland, the police enforce the Convention 
through a dedicated computer crime squad.137 This national 
unit resides between the Police Department of the Interior and 
the local police.138 Suspected computer related crimes are 
generally reported to the local police and communicated by the 
 
CYBERCRIME SERIES 4 (2012) (comparing countries’ levels of intermediary 
cybercrime). 
131. See id. The report concedes that the country of registration for an 
Autonomous System does not always reflect where the Autonomous System 
resides. The report includes a secondary measure referencing the physical 
location of the infrastructure determined from the routing locations. See id. 
at 8. 
132. Id. at 4. 
133. Id. at 9. 
134. See VALERI ET AL., supra note 54, at 90, 166-67. 
135. See id. at 167. 
136. Id. 
137. See id. at 98. 
138. See id. 
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police to the computer crime squad.139 Several other reporting 
mechanisms facilitate the communication of suspected 
cybercrime in Finland. The Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority includes the Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT-FI) which receives suspected security 
incidents from telecommunications operators and publishes 
them online.140 Further, the Council for Mass Media publishes 
decisions that are followed by subscribing organizations.141 
Finland and Lithuania also have similar criminal codes 
pertaining to cybercrime. Both countries are signatories to the 
Convention, so the cybercrime laws in each country mirror one 
another. Table 1 highlights both the provisions in the 
Convention pertaining to cybercrime and the corresponding 
laws in Lithuania and Finland.142 Also included are provisions 
pertaining to aiding and abetting and corporate liability.143 
Finland’s laws contain more provisions about cybercrime 
than Lithuania’s.144 However, both countries’ cybercrime laws 
contain similar content. For example, Article 3 of the 
Convention is encoded in Article 198 of Lithuanian law and 
three separate provisions in Finnish Law.145 All of these 
provisions proscribe the intentional interception of nonpublic 
computer data,146 but they only apply to the primary 
perpetrator; they do not address intermediaries. 
 
B. Cultural Distinctions 
 
Differences in Finland, Lithuania, and the United States’ 
laws cannot explain their differing levels of host and ISP 
cybercrime. In countries where corruption is systemic and 
endemic, people often lack short-term incentives to change 
their behavior.147 So even if a country has codified laws 
 
139. See id. at 98-99. 
140. See id. at 99. 
141. See id. 
142. See infra Table 1. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
147. See Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein & Jan Teorell, Why Anticorruption 
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prohibiting corrupt behaviors, those behaviors may persist 
because corruption is also a function of other key variables 
such as culture, history, the degree to which and length of time 
the country has been democratically governed, and the 
countries’ overall level of systemic corruption. It is to these 
variables that we now turn in explaining the differences 
between Finland and Lithuania while referencing the United 
States. 
 
1. Cultural Differences Between Nations 
 
Countries differ in terms of their cultures – their shared 
values, norms, and attitudes.148 These differences affect 
people’s propensity to engage in a host of behaviors, including 
corruption and cybercrime.149 Geert Hofstede, a pioneer in the 
study of cultural differences between peoples, proposed a 
theory of how various dimensions of a nation’s culture affect 
the behaviors of people. 150 Two of these dimensions – power 
distance and masculinity/femininity – seem to explain 
differences in host and ISP performance between Finland, 
Lithuania, and the United States.151 
Power Distance (PD) measures the degree to which people 
accept that power is unequally distributed in their culture.152 
The higher a nation’s PD score, the more its people accept 
unequal power distribution and the more comfortable they are 
with autocracy, paternalism, and top down hierarchy.153 The 
more accepting a culture is of PD, the more likely it is to 
 
Reforms Fail–Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem, 26 
GOVERNANCE 449 (2013). 
148. See Geert Hofstede et al., Measuring Organizational Cultures: A 
Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
286 (1990). 
149. See Sheheryar Banuri & Catherin Eckel, Experiments in Culture 
and Corruption: A Review 11 (The World Bank Dev. Research Group, 
Working Paper No. 6064, 2012). 
150. See Hofstede et al., supra note 148, at 286. 
151. See id. at 288. 
152. See National Cultural Dimensions, HOFSTEDE CENTRE, http://geert-
hofstede.com/national-culture.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter 
HOFSTEDE CENTRE]. 
153. See id. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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tolerate unfairness, injustice, and corruption.154 PD scores 
appear to correlate with intermediary corruption and 
cybercrime. For example, Finland, which has a low PD score of 
33, and Lithuania, which has a high PD score of 45.155 The U.S. 
is in the middle, with a PD score of 40, which also reflects its 
level of cybercrime between Finland and Lithuania.156 
Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity dimension is also useful 
in explaining differences between Finland and Lithuania. A 
masculine society is driven by competition, self-centeredness, 
and individual success, with success defined by the “winner.”157 
A feminine society puts a premium on caring for others.158 It is 
a society where one’s quality of life signals success, modesty is 
prized, and standing out from the group is not regarded as 
admirable.159 Finland, with a score of 26, is the most feminine 
society of the three.160 Lithuania, with a score of 65, is the most 
masculine.161 The United States, with a score of 62, is in the 
middle.162 This conforms to the expectation that in feminine 
societies, where people are more concerned about the welfare of 
others, people are more likely to be outraged by corruption and 
any situation where one person acts selfishly to the detriment 
of others, than in masculine societies. In fact, high levels of 
perceived corruption are correlated with masculinity.163 
 
154. See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country 
Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 278-79 (2003); 
Bryan W. Husted, Wealth, Culture, and Corruption, 30 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 
339, 343-44 (1999). 
155. See infra Table 2; see also Adura I. Mockaitis, A Cross-Cultural 
Study of Leadership Attitudes in Three Baltic Sea Region Countries, 1 INT’L J. 
LEADERSHIP STUD. 44, 46 (2005), 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/global/publications/ijls/new/vol1iss1/mockaitis/cro
ss_cultural.pdf. 
156. See infra Table 2. 
157. See HOFSTEDE CENTRE, supra note 152. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. See infra Table 2. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. See Rajib Sanyal, Determinants of Bribery in International 
Business: The Cultural and Economic Factors, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 139, 142 
(2005); see also Husted, supra note 154, at 339; Christopher J. Robertson & 
Andrew Watson, Corruption and Change: The Impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 385, 389-92 (2004). 
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2. The Cultural Legacy of Communism Versus Democracy 
 
A legacy of democracy or communism also seems to be a 
factor in determining a country’s level of corruption. Research 
shows that former communist countries, such as Lithuania, are 
more vulnerable to corruption than nations that were never 
communist.164 Researchers speculate that it is because 
communist countries had strong “survival” orientations, which 
have been linked in studies to higher levels of corruption.165 
Studies also support the flip-side: the longer a country’s 
exposure to democracy, the less corrupt it is likely to be.166 
Lithuania was a communist republic of the former Soviet 
Union from 1940 until 1990.167 As with many former 
communist states, the transition to democracy and a market 
economy has not overcome the survivalist mentality and 
culture of corruption.168 The process of privatization simply 
created new opportunities for corruption.169 
Finland and the United States, on the other hand, were 
never communist or under the Soviet Union. In fact, during the 
Russian Revolution, Finland defiantly declared independence 
from Russia, prompting a civil war in which the pro-Bolsheviks 
were defeated.170 Finland became a democratic presidential 
republic in 1919, with its citizens strongly encouraged to own 
land and participate in the market economy.171 
The United States, which declared independence in 1776, 
has been a democracy for the longest of the three countries. 
 
164. See Wayne Sandholtz & Rein Taagepera, Corruption, Culture, and 
Communism, 15 INT’L REV. SOC. 109, 110 (2005). 
165. See id. at 126. 
166. See generally Daniel Treisman, The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-
National Study, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 399 (2000). 
167. CIA, Lithuania, WORLD FACT BOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lh.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
168. See Sandholtz & Taagepera, supra note 164, at 109-10. 
169. See id. at 110. 
170. See Markus Jäntti et al., Growth and Equity in Finland 3-5 (World 
Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper 2006/06), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Janti_Saari_and_Vartiainen_Growth_and_Equity_in_Finlan
d.pdf. 
171. Id. 
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(Finland didn’t give birth to democracy until 1919).172 
Curiously, however, despite the United States being the oldest 
democracy, it falls between Finland and Lithuania in terms of 
cybercrime levels.173 
One possible explanation is that the United States has 
only been a full democracy since 1870, when the Constitution 
was amended to give African Americans the right to vote with 
the Fifteenth Amendment.174 However, this right was not fully 
realized for many African Americans until the Voting Rights 
Act in 1965.175 Women’s right to vote in the United States was 
not added to the Constitution until the 19th Amendment, which 
was passed in 1920.176 Finland, in contrast, granted suffrage to 
all citizens in 1919.177 
Another possible explanation is that the quality of 
democracy may be higher in Finland than the United States. 
Surveys show that Finnish citizens feel that they have more 
voice in selecting their government, a higher level of freedom of 
expression and association, and a freer media than American 
citizens do.178 
 
3. Level of Concern About Integrity, Business Climate,  
  Rule of Law, and Judicial Independence 
 
A number of other cultural variables are also useful in 
explaining differences between the countries. Consider, for 
 
172. Id.; CIA, United States, WORLD FACT BOOK, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
173. See GLOBAL SECURITY REPORT, supra note 130, at 9. 
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012). 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see also The Fight for Women's Suffrage 
(History Channel broadcast 2013), available at 
http://www.history.com/topics/the-fight-for-womens-suffrage. 
177. See Jäntti et al., supra note 170, at 6-9. 
178. Finland scores a 1.54; the US a 1.16; and Lithuania a 0.90 on 
Transparency International’s “Voice and Accountability” surveys. See Voice 
and Accountability, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/country (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). These 
surveys capture the public’s perceptions of the extent to which their country's 
citizens can participate in choosing their government, expressing themselves 
freely, associating freely, and how free the media is. 
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instance, concerns about integrity. Extrapolating from the 
levels of perceived corruption in the three countries, it is 
plausible to conclude that a culture of corruption and lack of 
concern about values is most endemic and widespread in 
Lithuania and least so in Finland. According to Transparency 
International, (the premier institution that maps global 
corruption rates) in 2013 Lithuania rates a low 54 out of 100 in 
corruption;179 Finland, a high 90 out of 100; while the US falls 
in the middle with a 73 out of 100. 180 Transparency 
International also reports that Lithuania is the worst at 
controlling corruption, with a score of 0.32; Finland is the best 
at controlling corruption, with a score of 2.15; while the United 
States is in the middle, with a 1.23.181 This correlates precisely 
with the host and ISP cybercrime rates in these countries. 
Other reports and surveys support the conclusion that 
Lithuania has the most corruption-prone culture, while 
Finland has the least. The culture of corruption in Lithuania, 
and its infiltration in the country’s upper echelons, for 
instance, is illuminated in the numerous high-profile cases of 
government abuse there. Cases involve officers ranging from 
city mayors, top national minister, upper level officers in the 
important Ministry of Economy, the Postal Service, the State 
Social Insurance Fund, and to the speaker of Parliament .182 
 
179. See Corruption Perception Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/#myAnchor2 (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013). 
180. See infra Table 4. It is notable that Transparency International 
rated Finland as the least corrupt country in 2012. Id. 
181. See id. According to Transparency International control of 
corruption is one of six dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicators. Id. 
182. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG, 
http://www.btiproject.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20
Lithuania.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). Vilius Navickas, the mayor of 
Vilnius, was forced to resign in 2010 because he had exerted pressure on the 
auditor of the municipal administration to resign for pursuing investigations 
about the construction of schools and the effectiveness of central heating in 
Vilnius. See id. at 8. The economic minister failed to declare his private 
interests in accordance with procedures and has been forced to resign. See id. 
In early 2011, the Prosecutor’s General Office charged three high-ranking 
officials of the Ministry of Economy for a number of corrupt acts. See id. 
High-ranking employees of Lithuania’s postal service and state social 
insurance fund were recently charged with corruption and the abuse of office. 
See id. There was a trial against Viktoras Muntianas, the former speaker of 
the parliament, who resigned in March 2008 amid allegations that he bribed 
26https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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Moreover, reports suggest that the number of criminal acts 
related to corruption are on the rise.183 
Reports show that Finland, in contrast, is relatively free 
from the serious, systemic kind of corruption that afflicts 
Lithuania.184 The Finnish population takes ethical values, 
honesty, and legal codes very seriously —that trend that has 
increased over the past ten years.185 
Finland’s concern with values is reflected in its proactively 
ethical corporate culture and ethically oriented corporate 
governance practices, including Internet companies.186 Finnish 
corporate governance is characterized by a high degree of self-
regulation, resulting in companies often imposing sanctions on 
one another.187 Transparency tends to permeate firms, as 
suggested by the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act 
requirement that institutions explain departures from 
shareholder recommendations.188 Not surprisingly, Finnish 
ISPs are known to “self-police” suspicious cybercrime activity, 
regardless of whether they have a legal obligation to do so.189 
TeliaSonera, a Finnish ISP, for instance, began an automated 
review system for its network in 1999.190 It is now fully 
automated and frequently updated.191 All this suggests that 
 
a deputy governor of Kaunas County to receive assistance for a relative’s 
business. See id. 
183. See id. The latest available data by the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Interior shows an increase in the number of criminal acts related to 
corruption. See id. In 2009, 890 such cases were registered, which is up 23% 
since 2008 (724). Id. A total of 479 persons were registered as suspects in 
corrupt activities, which is 10% more than those registered in 2008 (435). Id. 
It is not known whether this increase is a result of improvements to the fight 
against corruption or a rise in corrupt activities. See id. 
184. See Ari Salminen, Olli-Pekka Viinamäki & Rinna Ikola-Norrbacka, 
The Control of Corruption in Finland, 9 ADMINISTRATIE SI MGMT. PUB. 81, 81-
83 (2007) (Fin.). 
185. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, supra note 182. 
186. See DATAMONITOR, COUNTRY ANALYSIS REPORT-FINLAND–IN-DEPTH 
PESTLE INSIGHTS (2009). 
187. See id. 
188. See id. 
189. See Mirko Zorz, Behind the Scenes of the Cleanest ISP in the World, 
HELP NET SEC. (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.net-
security.org/article.php?id=1703. 
190. See id. 
191. See id. 
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improving the quality of service – rather than merely meeting 
the minimal threshold of legal obligations—is what drives most 
ISPs in Finland.192 
Unlike in Finland, we found no evidence of significant 
corporate transparency, corporate self-policing or any 
requirement that institutions explain departures from 
shareholder recommendations in the Lithuania. Needless to 
say, there is no evidence of ISPs self-policing in Lithuania. 
The United States record on ethical corporate governance 
is somewhere between Lithuania and Finland. The passage of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 improved, corporate 
transparency.193 However, corporate transparency is still 
problematic.194 In a few, but far from all, industries, American 
corporations should be commended for self-regulation.195 
United States firms tend not to impose sanctions on each other, 
as they do in Finland. Nor are United States firms obligated to 
explain departures from shareholder recommendations.196 A 
number of American ISPs have agreed to self-police in certain 
areas, such as piracy.197 However, many have not.198 Corporate 
governance is a reflection of societal culture and therefore 
 
192. See id. 
193. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see 
also Greg Zegarowski, Corporate Sustainability After Sarbanes-Oxley Linking 
Social-Political Initiatives and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise 
Resources, 4 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 52 (2007). 
194. See, e.g., Tessa Hebb, The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension 
Fund Investors’ Corporate Transparency Concerns, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 385 
(2006). 
195. See Robert Greenwald, News Corp: A Study in the Failure of 
Corporate Self-Regulation, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2011, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/26/news-
corporation-joel-klein; see also Lisa L. Sharma, Stephen P. Teret & Kelly D. 
Brownell, The Food Industry and Self-Regulation: Standards to Promote 
Success and to Avoid Public Health Failures, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240 
(2010). 
196. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005); see also SEC DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF 
REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE NOMINATION AND 
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS (2003), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyrpt.htm. 
197. See Ernesto Van Der Sar, Has Your ISP Joined the US “Six Strikes” 
Anti-Piracy Scheme?, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 3, 2012), 
https://torrentfreak.com/isp-six-strikes-anti-piracy-scheme-120803/. 
198. Id. 
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different countries manifest different corporate governance 
practices. Finland is the least corrupt country, Lithuania is the 
most corrupt and the United States is in between. 
There are two other sub-facets of a country’s culture that 
correlate with its overall levels of corruption: level of judicial 
independence and the degree to which the country has a rule of 
law.199 Both of these variables are related to the public trust in 
government, which correlates with the country’s level of 
integrity.200 According to Transparency International, in 
Lithuania, the rule of law is the weakest of all three 
countries.201 In Finland, the rule of law is the strongest (one of 
the strongest in the world) and in the United States the rule of 
law is in the middle.202 
According to Transparency International, with a score of 
6.4, Finland ranks highest in judicial independence.203 
Lithuania, with a score of 3.4, ranks lowest.204 The United 
States is in the middle with a score of 4.9.205 These results are 
borne out by other reports that show that in Finland, judges 
are professionally selected and public trust in the judiciary is 
 
199. See Judicial Independence, Transparency Int’l, 
http://www.transparency.org/country (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). Judicial 
Independence is an indicator in the Global Competitiveness Index produced 
by the World Economic Forum. See generally WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE 
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 12-13 (2013-2014), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-
14.pdf. It measures the perceived extent to which the judiciary of the country 
is independent from influences of members of government, citizens, or firms. 
See Judicial Independence, supra note 199. Rule of Law captures perceptions 
to the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. See 
id. Rule of Law is one of the six dimensions of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators. See id. Both Judicial Independence and Rule of Law are reported 
by Transparency International. See id. 
200. See Eric M. Uslaner, Trust and Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Johann Graf Lambsdorff et al. eds., 2004). 
Higher levels of public trust yield correlate with lower levels of corruption. 
See id. 
201. See infra Table 4. 
202. See id. In Lithuania, there are no or few constraints on the basic 
functions involved in the separation of powers, especially mutual checks and 
balances. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, supra note 182. 
203. See infra Table 5. 
204. See id. 
205. See id. 
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high.206 In Lithuania, judges are not professionally selected and 
public trust in the judiciary is low;207 only 20 percent of 
Lithuanian citizens trust the courts.208 Therefore, it is these 
countries’ cultural dimensions, more than their laws, that best 
explain differences in their levels of host and ISP cybercrime. 
 
IV. Recommendations 
 
There are two areas in which recommendations may assist 
countries such as Lithuania: cultural reforms and legal 
reforms. 
 
A. Proposals for Cultural Reform 
 
Research suggests that it is possible for a people’s culture 
to change and become less vulnerable to corruption.209 There 
are examples of cities, such as Hong Kong, which changed from 
having a culture that accepted corruption as a way of business 
to one that did not, and of countries whose people became less 
tolerant of wrongdoing.210 Many factors are involved in such 
transformations, some of which stem from the cultural 
variables outlined earlier. 
 
206. See How Europeans Trust Courts and Police, ECON. & SOC. 
RESEARCH COUNCIL (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-and-
events/features-casestudies/features/19793/how-europeans-trust-courts-and-
police.aspx. 
207. See infra Table 5. 
208. See BTI 2012: Lithuania Country Report, supra note 182 (According 
to a public opinion poll by Baltijos Tyrimai, only 20% of Lithuania’s citizens 
trust the courts and 71% do not, 19% and 41% respectively in 2008.). 
209. See Robert Klitgaard, President & Univ. Professor, Claremont 
Graduate Univ., Speech at the Second Session of the Conference of State 
Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Anti-Corruption: A 
Holistic Approach to the Fight Against Corruption (Jan. 29, 2008); see also 
Benny Pollack & Ann Matear, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Corruption in 
Chile, 25 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 371 (1996). 
210. See LOCAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS: WORLD CITIES FIGHTING CORRUPTION 
AND SAFEGUARDING INTEGRITY (Leo Huberts, Frank Anechiarico & Frédérique 
Six eds., 2008) (discussing how cities have successfully dealt with corruption); 
see also Alexander E.M. Hess & Michael Sauter, The Most Corrupt Countries 
in the World, USA TODAY (July 14, 2013, 7:02 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/14/most-corrupt-
countries/2512785/. 
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1. Enhancing Democratic Institutions 
 
There is a connection between the length of time a country 
has been a democracy, having a communist legacy, and 
corruption as discussed above. Given that connection, it would 
be logical to expect that reforms that enhance democracy would 
lower corruption in the long term, including cybercrime. There 
is vast literature on democracy building that outlines how the 
international community can help build and strengthen 
democratic institutions and improve a country’s level of trust, 
such as through controlled foreign direct investment and 
encouraging fiscal transparency and freedom of the press.211 
 
2. Civil Society 
 
A key element to stabilizing democracy and enhancing 
trust between people in a country involves supporting its civil 
society, the sphere of non-government organizations in which 
citizens voluntarily associate to share and advance common 
interests.212 These organizations generally include voluntary 
associations and non-profits organizations such as religious 
institutions, clubs, social movements, networks, and other 
 
211. See PETER BURNELL, BUILDING BETTER DEMOCRACIES: WHY 
POLITICAL PARTIES MATTER (2004), 
http://www.wfd.org/upload/docs/WFDBBD5_noprice.pdf; see also John C. 
Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger & Justin M. Grimes, Using ICTs to Create a Culture of 
Transparency: E-government and Social Media as Openness and Anti-
Corruption Tools for Societies, 27 GOV’T INFO. Q. 264 (2010); Ivar Kolstad & 
Arne Wiig, Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich 
Countries?, 37 WORLD DEV. 521 (2009); Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 
Causes of Corruption: A Survey of Cross-Country Analyses and Extended 
Results, 9 ECON. GOVERNANCE 245 (2008) (discussing the importance of 
newspapers to lower corruption levels); Robertson & Watson, supra note 163, 
at 385. 
212. See Pellegrini & Gerlagh, supra note 211, at 245 (finding that 
medium-long exposure to uninterrupted democracy is associated with lower 
corruption levels); see also Axel Hadenius & Fredrik Uggla, Making Civil 
Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: What Can States and 
Donors Do?, 24 WORLD DEV. 1621 (1996) (discussing the importance of a 
vigorous civil society for democratic stability and performance); Vilmos F. 
Misangy, Gary R. Weaver & Heather Elms, Ending Corruption: The Interplay 
Among Institutional Logics, Resources, and Institutional Entrepreneurs, 33 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 750 (2008). 
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informal groups.213 It is through these organizations that 
people exercise the freedom to come together and give voice to 
their individual and collective wishes, dreams, and 
expectations, share their interests, express their values and 
preferences, and build trust in each other.214 This kind of civic 
engagement can help fight corruption.215 Reform initiatives 
should thus support countries’ civil society organizations to 
strengthen the underlying civic participatory infrastructure – 
the vehicle through which trust can grow and democracies 
develop.216 
 
3. Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law 
 
Reformers should also design methods to strengthen 
judicial independence and the rule of law – two indicators of a 
country’s democratic vitality,217 the level of public trust in its 
courts and justice system, and its overall corruption levels.218 
There is a great deal of literature on how to build and bolster 
these institutions. 219 
 
4. Power Distance 
 
We might expect that, as democratic institutions develop, 
people would be increasingly less comfortable with power being 
 
213. Non-Governmental Organizations, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=23 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) 
214. See Nicholas Babchuk & John N. Edwards, Voluntary Associations 
and the Integration Hypothesis, 35 SOC. INQUIRY 149 (1965). 
215. See Frank Anechiarico, Administrative Culture and Civil Society: A 
Comparative Perspective, 30 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 13 (1998). 
216. See UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR W. ASIA, ENHANCING 
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC POLICY PROCESSES (2005), 
http://www.escwa.un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/sdd-10-tp1.pdf. 
217. See Hon. John M. Walker, Jr. & Daniel J.T. Schuker, Strengthening 
Judicial Independence in the New Constitutional Democracies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 43 (2012). 
218. See Daniel Lederman, Norman V. Loayza, & Rodrigo R. Soares, 
Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter, 17 ECON. & POL. 
1, 1 (2005). 
219. See e.g., PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING DEMOCRACY: DO POWER-SHARING 
INSTITUTIONS WORK? (2008); Stefan Wolff, Building Democratic States After 
Conflict: Institutional Design Revisited, 12 INT’L STUD.ZZ REV. 128 (2010). 
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unequally distributed. If so, the country’s PD would decline, 
which is associated with lower levels of corruption. This effect 
might be achieved through educational initiatives that teach 
students about the value of democracy and equality of 
opportunity. 
 
5. Masculinity/femininity 
 
As discussed earlier, the more feminine the culture, the 
less corrupt. The traditional understanding is that the number 
and quality of institutions that engage in caring for others in a 
society is an expression of the people’s level of empathy and 
compassion in that society.220 However, the logic set forth by 
scholars Shadnam and Thomas—that integrity flows, not only 
from communities of individuals to organizations, but also from 
organizations back to communities of individuals—suggests 
that if reformers increase the number and quality of empathic 
institutions in a society, that could make its people more caring 
in the long-run too. 221 If so, reformers should not neglect 
interventions that create institutions that serve others with 
compassion in a country. 
 
6. Law Enforcement 
 
Lastly, improving the policing of corruption and 
cybercrime and enhancing the penalties for those who engage 
in wrongdoing can change a culture of corruption.222 Enhancing 
law enforcement can change a culture, not only through 
deterrence, but also by signaling that society strongly values 
 
220. See Kees van den Bos et al., The Psychology of Voice and 
Performance Capabilities in Masculine and Feminine Cultures and Contexts, 
99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 638, 639 (2010); Warren French & 
Alexander Weis, An Ethics of Care or an Ethics of Justice, 27 J. BUS. ETHICS 
125, 126-27 (2000). 
221. See Masoud Shadnam & Thomas B. Lawrence, Understanding 
Widespread Misconduct in Organizations: An Institutional Theory of Moral 
Collapse, 21 BUS. ETHICS Q. 379, 381 (2011). 
222. See Catherine D. Marcum, George E. Higgins & Richard 
Tewksbury, Doing Time for Cyber Crime: An Examination of the Correlates of 
Sentence Length in the United States, 5 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 825, 833 
(2011). 
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honest and integrity. 223 While there will always be scofflaws, it 
is the predominant signals that society consistently and 
repeatedly sends that affect the culture most.224 Being serious 
about prosecuting wrongdoing is one of the key ways to 
demonstrate this. 
 
B. Proposal for Legal Reform 
 
Changing a society’s culture, however, takes time.225 So 
until a cultural shift occurs, legal reform that deals with the 
short-term is in order. Imposing liability on intermediaries is a 
key strategy for improvement. While this recommendation 
would apply to individual countries, collectively they would 
have a global impact.226 
The recommended liability scheme modeled below consists 
of several layers of coordination between the government and 
those who have been victimized by cybercrime.227 First, a 
regulatory body, such as the Cybercrime Unit within the 
Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau, could publish an updated 
list of most nefarious hosts, those most closely aligned with 
cybercriminals.228 The hosts would then have the opportunity 
 
223. See generally ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: 
CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 3-7 (1975). 
224. See LYDIA G. SEGAL, BATTLING CORRUPTION IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS (2004); see generally Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 
Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic 
Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007); Petter Langseth, Prevention: 
An Effective Tool to Reduce Corruption, GLOBAL PROGRAM AGAINST 
CORRUPTION CONF. (1999), 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp2.pdf; Marie Talec, 
Comparative Law: Of the Impact of Legal Systems on Corruption – A 
Comparative Study of France and Finland, ACADEMIA.EDU 15, 
http://www.academia.edu/835544/Of_the_impact_of_legal_systems_on_corrup
tion_-_Comparative_study_of_France_and_Finland (last visited Oct. 18, 
2013). 
225. See DANIEL CHIROT, HOW SOCIETIES CHANGE (SAGE Publications 
2011). 
226. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 70, at 30; see also Tomer 
Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and Insourcing Crime: The Political 
Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 VAND. L. REV. 795, 826-27 
(2009). 
227. See Broadhurst, supra note 35, at 416 (noting the need for 
cooperation between law enforcement and private citizens). 
228. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 24. Regulators could apply the 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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to remove themselves from the list within a specified period 
through remedial action.229 Those remaining on the list would 
be subject to governmental fines.230 Next, the affiliated ISP 
could be subjected to both regulatory fines imposed by the 
government and independent private rights of action by victims 
of cybercrime on the ISPs network if it does not discontinue its 
relationship with the host.231 Figure 2 represents a schematic 
of the liability scheme. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 There are a number of benefits to this model. First, it 
imposes liability on the static and well-funded ISP that also 
plays the part of a pseudo online regulator.232 As noted above, 
absent liability on behalf of ISPs harmed parties are often left 
 
methodology in the Host Exploit reports for instance. See GLOBAL SECURITY 
REPORT, supra note 130. 
229. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 24. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 70-86. 
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without a remedy as they hunt individual perpetrators and 
underfunded hosts.233 Further, it removes the hurdle of 
imposing a knowledge element on behalf of ISPs. ISPs would, 
therefore, have a legal duty to monitor the list of “bad” hosts.234 
Second, the scheme incorporates the culpability of hosts.235 
The host would be front and center on published reports and 
subjected to fines.236 Admittedly, locating and tracking shifty 
hosts will present a challenge to regulatory bodies and the fines 
may only have a minor effect.237 However, it is the relationship 
with the ISPs that will create the greatest deterrent as hosts 
remaining on the list will be unable to find ISPs willing to work 
with them.238 
Third, an important component of the scheme is that it 
limits the government’s involvement by relying on private 
parties to initiate lawsuits against ISPs. Norms are formed on 
networks and those norms are enforced in several manners.239 
It may take its form in public enforcement with not only 
criminal liability but also tort liability.240 Thus, not only do 
domestic criminal codes and international agreements play a 
role in deterring cybercrime so too does private law.241 There is 
an inherent lack of incentive structure in public law schemes 
 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
235. See id. (discussing quasi regulatory function of ISPs); see also 
SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 23 (noting criticism of the scheme that ignores 
culpability of hosts). 
236. See SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 23 
237. See id. 
238. See generally SHACHTMAN, supra note 69, at 23. 
239. See Amitai Aviram, Network Responses to Network Threats: The 
Evolution into Private Cybersecurity Associations, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS 
OF CYBERSECURITY 143,143 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006). 
240. See id. at 145. Alternatively, norms may be enforced through 
private legal systems which arise when norms are enforced by non-
governmental institutions. See id. For example, parties could enter into a 
private contract that would thereby assign rights privately but would rely 
upon the court systems to enforce those rights. See id. 
241. See Broadhurst, supra note 35, at 412. “[T]he role of public-private 
police partnerships in the market-place and the emergence of civil society on 
the Internet combined with public awareness has become essential to contain 
cyber-crime amongst ordinary users.” Id. at 413. The Convention 
contemplates a framework of cooperation between “private police” and NGOs 
to successfully fill the gaps within the sovereign state system. See id. at 414. 
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because it often inserts uninformed government officials into 
the economy.242 Further, governments often decline to pursue 
the hackers because of either a lack of resources or because the 
state is providing some support for its activities.243 This is 
particularly true in countries such as Lithuania where 
corruption is more prevalent.244 Furthermore, to the extent 
that intermediaries are being shut down now, it is often the 
result of investigations by the private community.245 Here, 
harmed parties have direct recourse against ISPs. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Fighting cybercrime has proven to be a daunting task. This 
Article highlights new avenues to tackle the problem by 
focusing on how hosts and ISPs can be corralled into the fight 
against cybercrime. The Article proposes legal reforms that 
impose liability in a manner designed to have an effective 
impact while preventing ISPs or hosts from going out of 
business. It also proposes societal reforms to shift the culture 
and business environment to be less tolerant of corruption and 
more ethically proactive. These reform initiatives will require a 
great deal of effort and commitment from members of the 
international community in addition to domestic efforts. 
However difficult, these reforms and efforts are essential to 
securing a safe and reliable Internet. 
  
 
242. See Juan Javier del Granado, The Genius of Roman Law From a 
Law and Economics Perspective, 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 301, 302 (2011) 
(“Private law as a system of incentives and a means of communication allows 
people with information to make decisions and people with incentives to take 
action in the economy.”). 
243. See Loveland et al., supra note 16. 
244. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, 
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2-3 (1974) 
(contending that there would be less incentive to bribe thereby diminishing 
the deterrent effect if private enforcers were compensated via the phones 
collected from offenders). 
245. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
37
  
2014] GLOBAL CYBER INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY 623 
Table 1—Convention Provisions246 
 
 Convention Lithuania Laws Finland Laws 
Article 2 – 
Illegal 
Access 
 
[Each party 
country shall 
adopt domestic 
laws] when 
committed 
intentionally, the 
access to the 
whole or any part 
of a computer 
system without 
right. A Party 
may require that 
the offence be 
committed by 
infringing 
security 
measures, with 
the intent of 
obtaining 
computer data or 
other dishonest 
intent, or in 
relation to a 
computer system 
that is connected 
to another 
computer system. 
Article 198 
Misappropriation 
and 
Dissemination of 
Computer 
Information 
Article 198-1 
Illegal Access to 
Computer or to 
Network 
 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 38, 
Section 8 
(Computer 
break-in) 
Article 3 – 
Illegal 
Interception 
[Each party 
country shall 
adopt domestic 
laws] when 
committed 
intentionally, the 
Article 198 
Misappropriation 
and 
Dissemination of 
Computer 
Information 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 38, 
Section 3 
(message 
interference) 
Penal Code, 
 
246. See generally Cybercrime Legislation Country Profile: Finland, 
COUNCIL OF EUR. (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/co
untryprofiles/cyber_cp_Finland_2009_February.pdf; Cybercrime Legislation 
Country Profile: Lithuania, COUNCIL OF EUR. (May 30, 2007), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/co
untryprofiles/cyber_cp_Lithuania_2007_May.pdf. 
38https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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interception 
without right, 
made by technical 
means, of non-
public 
transmissions of 
computer data to, 
from or within a 
computer system, 
including 
electromagnetic 
emissions from a 
computer system 
carrying such 
computer data. A 
Party may 
require that the 
offence be 
committed with 
dishonest intent, 
or in relation to a 
computer system 
that is connected 
to another 
computer system. 
 Chapter 38, 
Section 4 
(aggravated 
message 
interference) 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 38, 
Section 8, 
paragraph 2 
 
Article 4 – 
Data 
Interference 
 
[Each party 
country shall 
adopt domestic 
laws] when 
Committed 
intentionally, the 
damaging, 
deletion, 
deterioration, 
alteration or 
suppression of 
computer data 
without right. 
Article 196 
Destruction or 
Change of 
Computer 
Information 
 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 35, 
Section 1 
(criminal 
damage) 
 
Article 5 – 
System 
Interference 
 
[Each party 
country shall 
adopt domestic 
laws] the serious 
hindering without 
right of the 
Article 197 
Destruction or 
Replacement of 
Software, 
Disruption of the 
Operation of 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 38, 
Section 5 
(interference) 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 38, 
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functioning of a 
computer system 
by inputting, 
transmitting, 
damaging, 
deleting, 
deteriorating, 
altering or 
suppressing 
computer data 
Computer 
Network, Data 
bank or 
Information 
System 
 
Section 7a 
(interference 
in computer 
system) 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 38, 
Section 7b 
(aggravated 
interference 
in computer 
system) 
 
Article 11 – 
Attempt 
and aiding 
and 
abetting 
 [Each party 
country shall 
adopt domestic 
laws] aiding or 
abetting the 
commission of 
any of the 
offences 
established in 
accordance with 
Articles 2 
through 10 of the 
present 
Convention with 
intent that such 
offence be 
committed. 
Article 25 
Conspiracy and 
Forms of 
Conspiracy 
 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 5, 
Section 5 
(instigation) 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 5, 
Section 6 
(abetting) 
 
Article 12 – 
Corporate 
Liability 
1 Each Party 
shall adopt such 
legislative and 
other measures 
as may be 
necessary to 
ensure that legal 
persons can be 
held liable for a 
criminal offence 
established in 
accordance with 
this Convention, 
committed for 
their benefit by 
Article 22 
Criminal Liability 
of Enterprises 
 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 9, 
Section 1 
(scope of 
application) 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 9, 
Section 2 
(prerequisites 
for liability) 
Penal Code, 
Chapter 9, 
Section 3 
(connection 
offender and 
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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any natural 
person, acting 
either 
individually or as 
part of an organ 
of the legal 
person, who has a 
leading position 
within it, based 
on: 
a. power of 
representation of 
the legal person; 
b. an authority to 
take decisions on 
behalf of the legal 
person; 
c an authority to 
exercise control 
within the legal 
person. 
2. In addition to 
the cases already 
provided for in 
paragraph 1 of 
this article, each 
Party shall take 
the measures 
necessary to 
ensure that a 
legal person can 
be held liable 
where the lack of 
supervision or 
control by a 
natural person 
referred to in 
paragraph 1 has 
made possible the 
commission of a 
criminal offence 
established in 
accordance with 
this Convention 
corporation) 
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for the benefit of 
that legal person 
by a natural 
person acting 
under its 
authority. 
 
 
Table 2247 
 
 United States  Finland Lithuania 
 
Power 
Distance 
The US scores a 
40. Within 
American 
organizations, 
hierarchy is 
established for 
convenience, 
superiors are 
always accessible 
and managers 
rely on 
individual 
employees and 
teams for their 
expertise. Both 
managers and 
employees expect 
to be consulted 
and information 
is shared 
frequently. At 
the same time, 
communication 
is informal, 
direct and 
participative. 
 
Finland scores a 33 
which means that 
the following 
characterizes the 
Finnish style: Being 
independent, 
hierarchy for 
convenience only, 
equal rights, 
superiors accessible, 
coaching leader, 
management 
facilitates and 
empowers. Power is 
decentralized and 
managers count on 
the experience of 
their team members. 
Employees expect to 
be consulted. Control 
is disliked and 
attitude towards 
managers are 
informal and on first 
name basis. 
Communication is 
direct and 
participative. 
45   
 
 
247. Finland, HOFSTEDE CENTRE, http://geert-hofstede.com/finland.html 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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Individualism The US scores a 
91. The 
expectation is 
that people look 
after themselves 
and their 
immediate 
families. There is 
also a high 
degree of 
geographical 
mobility in the 
United States 
and most 
Americans are 
accustomed to 
doing business 
with, or 
interacting, with 
strangers. In the 
business world, 
employees are 
expected to be 
self-reliant and 
display 
initiative. 
Finland scores a 63. 
Individuals are 
expected to take care 
of themselves and 
their immediate 
families only. In 
individualistic 
societies offence 
causes guilt and a 
loss of self-esteem, 
the 
employer/employee 
relationship is a 
contract based on 
mutual advantage, 
hiring and promotion 
decisions are 
supposed to be based 
on merit only, 
management is the 
management of 
individuals. 
 
50   
 
Masculinity / 
Femininity 
The US scores a 
62. It is 
considered a 
“masculine” 
society. Behavior 
in school, work, 
and play are 
based on the 
shared values 
that people 
should “strive to 
be the best they 
can be” and that 
“the winner 
takes all”. 
Typically, 
Americans “live 
to work” so that 
Finland scores a 26. 
It is considered a 
feminine society. The 
focus is on “working 
in order to live”, 
managers strive for 
consensus, people 
value equality, 
solidarity and 
quality in their 
working lives. 
Conflicts are 
resolved by 
compromise and 
negotiation. 
Incentives such as 
free time and 
flexibility are 
65   
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they can earn 
monetary 
rewards and 
attain higher 
status based on 
how good one can 
be. Conflicts are 
resolved at the 
individual level 
and the goal is to 
win. 
favored. Focus is on 
well-being, status is 
not shown. 
 
Table 3—Corruption248 
 
 United States Finland Lithuania 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
2012: 
Rank: 19 /176 
Score: 73 /100 
 
2012: 
Rank: 1 /176 
Score: 90 /100 
 
2012: 
Rank: 48 /176 
Score: 54 /100 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
2010: 
Percentile 
Rank: 86% 
Score: 
1.232890271 
2010: 
Percentile 
Rank: 98% 
Score: 
2.14583654 
 
2010: 
Percentile 
Rank: 66% 
Score: 
0.322105477 
 
 
Table 4—Rule of Law 
 
 United States Finland Lithuania 
Rule of 
Law 
2010: 
Percentile 
Rank: 91% 
Score: 
1.584584729 
2010: 
Percentile Rank: 
100% 
Score: 
1.971099617 
 
2010: 
Percentile 
Rank:72% 
Score: 
0.760096151 
 
 
  
 
248. Corruption by Country, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
44https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss2/3
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Table 5—Judicial Independence249 
 
 United 
States 
Finland Lithuania 
Judicial 
Independence 
2011-2012 
Rank: 36 /142 
Score: 4.9 /7 
 
2011-2012 
Rank: 4 /142 
Score: 6.4 /7 
 
2011-2012 
Rank: 84 /142 
Score: 3.4 /7 
 
 
 
 
249. Id. 
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